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Single Idea 21501

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory ]

Full Idea

To doubt our sense of past experience as founded in actuality, would be to lose any criterion by which either the doubt itself or what is doubted could be corroborated.

Gist of Idea

If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted

Source

C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 358), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 3.3.1

Book Ref

Olsson,Erik J.: 'Against Coherence' [OUP 2008], p.50


A Reaction

Obviously scepticism about memory can come in degrees, but total rejection of short-term and clear memories looks like a non-starter. What could you put in its place? Hyper-rationalism? Even maths needs memory.


The 5 ideas from 'An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation'

Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]