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Single Idea 21503

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification ]

Full Idea

An empirical coherence theory needs, for the beliefs of a cognitive system to be even candidates for empirical justification, that the system must contain laws attributing a high degree of reliability to a variety of spontaneous cognitive beliefs.

Gist of Idea

Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience

Source

Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 7.1)

Book Ref

Bonjour,Laurence: 'The Structure of Empirical Knowledge' [Harvard 1985], p.141

A Reaction

Wanting such a 'law' seems optimistic, and not in the spirit of true coherentism, which can individually evaluate each experiential belief. I'm not sure Bonjour's Observation Requirement is needed, since it is incoherent to neglect observations.

The 31 ideas with the same theme [proposal that coherent support creates knowledge]:

22109 The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
15977 Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke]
7070 Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley]
22058 Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie]
23029 Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
23034 The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
17639 Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
6369 In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
9329 Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer]
8839 Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
2773 Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
2779 Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
2786 For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
21506 A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour]
21509 There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour]
21503 Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour]
19513 A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
17700 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
10331 Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
10338 The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
4723 Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
6596 For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
21515 Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
21514 Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
8843 Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
8844 Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
8618 Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]