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Single Idea 21533
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
]
Full Idea
Contingency derives from the fact that a sentence containing a verb in the present tense - or sometimes in the past or the future - changes its meaning continually as the present changes, and stands for different propositions at different times.
Gist of Idea
Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer
Source
Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.26)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.26
A Reaction
This immediately strikes me as a bad example of the linguistic approach to philosophy. As if we (like any animal) didn't have an apprehension prior to any language that most parts of experience are capable of change.
The
581 ideas
from Bertrand Russell
6410
|
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6417
|
In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6474
|
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour
[Russell]
|
6476
|
We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data
[Russell]
|
6475
|
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar
[Russell]
|
2792
|
It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories
[Russell]
|
22326
|
Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate
[Russell]
|
6418
|
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6402
|
In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
21706
|
At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
14732
|
A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre
[Russell]
|
14733
|
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science
[Russell]
|
23154
|
We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other
[Russell]
|
23152
|
Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear
[Russell]
|
23153
|
Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality
[Russell]
|
23151
|
A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups
[Russell]
|
23155
|
In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey
[Russell]
|
23156
|
The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit
[Russell]
|
23157
|
Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires
[Russell]
|
23162
|
Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism
[Russell]
|
23158
|
Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker
[Russell]
|
23161
|
Slaves can be just as equal as free people
[Russell]
|
23159
|
Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution
[Russell]
|
23160
|
Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot
[Russell]
|
23168
|
A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses
[Russell]
|
23164
|
Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert
[Russell]
|
23167
|
Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers
[Russell]
|
23163
|
In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible
[Russell]
|
23166
|
In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government
[Russell]
|
23165
|
Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade
[Russell]
|
20176
|
Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power
[Russell]
|
20180
|
A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life
[Russell]
|
20177
|
Boredom always involves not being fully occupied
[Russell]
|
20178
|
Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening
[Russell]
|
20179
|
Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this
[Russell]
|
10052
|
Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry
[Russell, by Musgrave]
|
10053
|
Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true
[Russell]
|
2609
|
If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees
[Russell]
|
4786
|
Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants
[Russell, by Psillos]
|
16489
|
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'?
[Russell]
|
16488
|
It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation
[Russell]
|
16490
|
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities
[Russell]
|
16491
|
If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts
[Russell]
|
16482
|
All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words
[Russell]
|
16485
|
Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism?
[Russell]
|
16476
|
For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true
[Russell]
|
16479
|
'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs
[Russell]
|
16481
|
'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world
[Russell]
|
16487
|
Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic
[Russell]
|
16480
|
A disjunction expresses indecision
[Russell]
|
16486
|
The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does
[Russell]
|
16475
|
A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no!
[Russell]
|
16477
|
Asserting not-p is saying p is false
[Russell]
|
16483
|
Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory.
[Russell]
|
16484
|
There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things
[Russell]
|
16478
|
A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens
[Russell]
|
2947
|
Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle
[Russell]
|
4758
|
Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false
[Russell]
|
21563
|
The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members
[Russell]
|
21564
|
Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL
[Russell]
|
21565
|
Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined
[Russell]
|
8469
|
Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions
[Russell, by Orenstein]
|
8468
|
The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false
[Russell, by Orenstein]
|
13414
|
For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets
[Russell, by Benacerraf]
|
14420
|
Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics
[Russell]
|
8745
|
Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world
[Russell]
|
14423
|
'0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms
[Russell]
|
14422
|
Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms
[Russell]
|
14421
|
Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult
[Russell]
|
14424
|
Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties
[Russell]
|
14425
|
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size
[Russell]
|
14426
|
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property
[Russell]
|
14427
|
We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes
[Russell]
|
14428
|
Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous
[Russell]
|
14430
|
If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive
[Russell]
|
14429
|
Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics
[Russell]
|
14431
|
The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms
[Russell]
|
14441
|
The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive
[Russell]
|
10450
|
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions
[Russell, by Bach]
|
13510
|
Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression?
[Russell, by Hart,WD]
|
14432
|
'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a
[Russell]
|
14435
|
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science
[Russell]
|
14433
|
Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them?
[Russell]
|
14434
|
What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature
[Russell]
|
14436
|
A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum
[Russell]
|
14439
|
A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers
[Russell]
|
14438
|
New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations
[Russell]
|
14440
|
We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them
[Russell]
|
14442
|
If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common
[Russell]
|
14443
|
The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency
[Russell]
|
14444
|
Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered
[Russell]
|
14445
|
Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater
[Russell]
|
14446
|
We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class
[Russell]
|
14447
|
Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms'
[Russell]
|
12197
|
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true
[Russell]
|
14450
|
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions
[Russell]
|
14449
|
There is always something psychological about inference
[Russell]
|
14453
|
The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M?
[Russell]
|
14454
|
An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true
[Russell]
|
14452
|
All the propositions of logic are completely general
[Russell]
|
14451
|
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts
[Russell]
|
12444
|
Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology
[Russell]
|
14457
|
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that'
[Russell]
|
14458
|
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description
[Russell]
|
7311
|
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that'
[Russell]
|
14455
|
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not
[Russell]
|
14456
|
'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity
[Russell]
|
14459
|
Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function
[Russell]
|
14461
|
Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions
[Russell]
|
14460
|
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary
[Russell]
|
14465
|
Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men'
[Russell]
|
14462
|
In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical
[Russell]
|
10057
|
Logic can only assert hypothetical existence
[Russell]
|
14464
|
Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world
[Russell]
|
14463
|
Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named
[Russell]
|
21570
|
Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away
[Russell]
|
8854
|
My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York
[Williams,M on Russell]
|
21710
|
We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does'
[Russell]
|
21571
|
Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy
[Russell]
|
21572
|
Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other
[Russell]
|
21573
|
When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all
[Russell]
|
21575
|
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group
[Russell]
|
21576
|
With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible
[Russell]
|
21577
|
Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality
[Russell]
|
21574
|
Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors
[Russell]
|
21578
|
Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate
[Russell]
|
6416
|
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
21579
|
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way
[Russell]
|
21580
|
Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them
[Russell]
|
21582
|
Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics
[Russell]
|
21581
|
We never experience times, but only succession of events
[Russell]
|
21583
|
When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process
[Russell]
|
21584
|
A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom
[Russell]
|
21585
|
The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time
[Russell]
|
21586
|
The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context
[Russell]
|
21588
|
Logic gives the method of research in philosophy
[Russell]
|
21587
|
Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system
[Russell]
|
21684
|
Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts
[Russell]
|
22316
|
A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive
[Russell]
|
10968
|
Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions
[Russell, by Read]
|
6107
|
It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy
[Russell]
|
6109
|
Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions
[Russell]
|
6108
|
Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations
[Russell]
|
6110
|
Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages
[Russell]
|
6111
|
As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form
[Russell]
|
6112
|
Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types
[Russell]
|
6113
|
To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them
[Russell]
|
6114
|
'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis
[Russell]
|
6115
|
Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language
[Russell]
|
6116
|
A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language
[Russell]
|
6117
|
Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error
[Russell]
|
21722
|
Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown
[Russell]
|
6118
|
Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis
[Russell]
|
10059
|
In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth
[Russell]
|
7554
|
Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp
[Russell]
|
7556
|
A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number
[Russell]
|
7557
|
To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts
[Russell]
|
21532
|
Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential
[Russell]
|
21533
|
Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer
[Russell]
|
21534
|
The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate
[Russell]
|
21535
|
Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time
[Russell]
|
21536
|
When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing
[Russell]
|
21537
|
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations'
[Russell]
|
21538
|
If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind
[Russell]
|
21539
|
Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p
[Russell]
|
21540
|
Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation
[Russell]
|
21541
|
The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object
[Russell]
|
21542
|
Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects?
[Russell]
|
21543
|
If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist
[Russell]
|
21544
|
It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist
[Russell]
|
21531
|
Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true
[Lackey on Russell]
|
21545
|
I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting
[Russell]
|
21546
|
We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us
[Russell]
|
21547
|
On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist
[Russell]
|
21550
|
Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters
[Russell]
|
21551
|
Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric
[Russell]
|
21552
|
Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision
[Russell]
|
6420
|
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy
[Russell]
|
6419
|
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism
[Russell]
|
6426
|
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it
[Russell]
|
7528
|
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions
[Russell]
|
6423
|
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts
[Russell]
|
6424
|
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess
[Russell]
|
6425
|
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion
[Russell]
|
6427
|
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false
[Russell]
|
6431
|
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience'
[Russell]
|
6430
|
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds
[Russell]
|
6432
|
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have
[Russell]
|
6434
|
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities
[Russell]
|
6433
|
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images
[Russell]
|
6435
|
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words
[Russell]
|
6438
|
Complex things can be known, but not simple things
[Russell]
|
6440
|
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals
[Russell]
|
6437
|
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate
[Russell]
|
6436
|
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience
[Russell]
|
6439
|
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate
[Russell]
|
6442
|
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences
[Russell]
|
6443
|
Surprise is a criterion of error
[Russell]
|
6441
|
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes
[Russell]
|
6444
|
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment
[Russell]
|
4396
|
The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy
[Russell]
|
8375
|
'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument
[Russell]
|
8376
|
If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling
[Russell]
|
8378
|
Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science
[Russell]
|
8379
|
In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars
[Russell]
|
8380
|
Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work
[Russell]
|
8381
|
The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect
[Russell]
|
11006
|
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions
[Read on Russell]
|
6061
|
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier
[Russell, by McGinn]
|
6411
|
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims
[Grayling on Russell]
|
10433
|
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
18944
|
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F)
[Sawyer on Russell]
|
7758
|
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
18941
|
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
4945
|
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise
[Russell, by Kripke]
|
18942
|
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object
[Russell, by Sawyer]
|
7745
|
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names?
[McCullogh on Russell]
|
2612
|
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates
[Russell, by Ayer]
|
7757
|
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
15159
|
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
|
10449
|
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
|
18943
|
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false
[Sawyer on Russell]
|
1608
|
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed
[Russell, by Quine]
|
7754
|
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
21529
|
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic
[Russell, by Lackey]
|
11009
|
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false
[Read on Russell]
|
6333
|
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic
[Russell, by Horwich]
|
6412
|
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique
[Grayling on Russell]
|
7743
|
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names
[Russell, by McCullogh]
|
7310
|
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names
[Russell, by Miller,A]
|
12006
|
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems
[Russell, by Forbes,G]
|
4569
|
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
|
21549
|
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers
[Lackey on Russell]
|
12796
|
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars
[Laycock on Russell]
|
7532
|
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes
[Russell, by Monk]
|
11988
|
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description
[Kaplan on Russell]
|
6063
|
Russell can't attribute existence to properties
[McGinn on Russell]
|
18777
|
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle
[Linsky,B on Russell]
|
18775
|
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
7533
|
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals
[Russell, by Monk]
|
16385
|
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely
[Russell, by Recanati]
|
4567
|
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words
[Russell, by Cooper,DE]
|
5810
|
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions
[Donnellan on Russell]
|
16987
|
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense'
[Russell, by Kripke]
|
4570
|
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions
[Cooper,DE on Russell]
|
16349
|
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible
[Russell, by Recanati]
|
7313
|
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent)
[Russell, by Miller,A]
|
7767
|
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions
[Russell, by Lycan]
|
5772
|
The idea of a variable is fundamental
[Russell]
|
5774
|
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions
[Russell]
|
5775
|
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different
[Russell]
|
5773
|
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..'
[Russell]
|
21726
|
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance
[Russell]
|
5779
|
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws
[Russell]
|
5778
|
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches
[Russell]
|
5780
|
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character
[Russell]
|
5781
|
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions
[Russell]
|
5782
|
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition'
[Russell]
|
5784
|
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs
[Russell]
|
5783
|
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky
[Russell]
|
5777
|
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'
[Russell]
|
5776
|
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely
[Russell]
|
22891
|
We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement
[Russell, by Bardon]
|
21742
|
Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom
[Russell]
|
21741
|
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval
[Russell]
|
21746
|
Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love
[Russell]
|
21747
|
Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge
[Russell]
|
21743
|
In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose
[Russell]
|
21744
|
Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires
[Russell]
|
21745
|
Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires
[Russell]
|
21740
|
I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy
[Russell]
|
22306
|
To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing
[Russell]
|
22308
|
Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis
[Russell]
|
22307
|
Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact
[Russell]
|
5465
|
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states
[Russell, by Ellis]
|
18376
|
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts
[Russell, by Armstrong]
|
6060
|
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true
[Russell]
|
21708
|
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions)
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
19051
|
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data
[Russell, by Quine]
|
18348
|
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers
[Russell, by Rami]
|
7744
|
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions
[Russell, by McCullogh]
|
21702
|
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts'
[Russell, by Quine]
|
9022
|
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes
[Quine on Russell]
|
6090
|
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences
[Russell]
|
6089
|
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis
[Russell]
|
6091
|
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation
[Russell]
|
6092
|
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object
[Russell]
|
6093
|
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared
[Russell]
|
6095
|
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world
[Russell]
|
6094
|
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions
[Russell]
|
6096
|
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods
[Russell]
|
6097
|
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent
[Russell]
|
6098
|
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition
[Russell]
|
6100
|
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts
[Russell]
|
6099
|
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions
[Russell]
|
6119
|
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name
[Russell]
|
6101
|
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'
[Russell]
|
6102
|
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to
[Russell]
|
6103
|
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical
[Russell]
|
6106
|
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely
[Russell]
|
6105
|
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality
[Russell]
|
6104
|
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions
[Russell]
|
10423
|
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
10426
|
A name has got to name something or it is not a name
[Russell]
|
21712
|
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday
[Russell]
|
21709
|
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert
[Russell]
|
23169
|
Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy
[Russell]
|
23170
|
Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence
[Russell]
|
23171
|
Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred
[Russell]
|
23172
|
Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness
[Russell]
|
22329
|
Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality
[Russell, by Glock]
|
21569
|
It is good to generalise truths as much as possible
[Russell]
|
7529
|
All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions
[Russell]
|
21521
|
Anarchy does not maximise liberty
[Russell]
|
21523
|
We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament
[Russell]
|
21522
|
Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution
[Russell]
|
21517
|
Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect
[Russell]
|
21520
|
That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life
[Russell]
|
21518
|
Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty
[Russell]
|
21495
|
Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals
[Russell]
|
21519
|
We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity
[Russell]
|
21525
|
When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people
[Russell]
|
21524
|
The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income
[Russell]
|
21528
|
Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator
[Russell]
|
21527
|
On every new question the majority is always wrong at first
[Russell]
|
21526
|
Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity
[Russell]
|
21681
|
Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced
[Russell]
|
11010
|
Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought
[Russell]
|
11849
|
It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common
[Wittgenstein on Russell]
|
15894
|
Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor
[Russell, by Lavine]
|
18722
|
Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation
[Wittgenstein on Russell]
|
15895
|
Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work
[Russell, by Lavine]
|
7530
|
Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class'
[Russell, by Monk]
|
18254
|
Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8
[Russell, by Dummett]
|
19164
|
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable
[Davidson on Russell]
|
14102
|
What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions'
[Russell]
|
14103
|
Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q'
[Russell]
|
14104
|
Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous
[Russell]
|
14105
|
There seem to be eight or nine logical constants
[Russell]
|
14106
|
Implication cannot be defined
[Russell]
|
14107
|
Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes
[Russell]
|
14108
|
It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication
[Russell]
|
14109
|
The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy
[Russell]
|
7781
|
I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence.
[Russell]
|
14110
|
Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves
[Russell]
|
14111
|
A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it
[Russell]
|
14112
|
A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole'
[Russell]
|
14113
|
The null class is a fiction
[Russell]
|
14114
|
Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions
[Russell]
|
14115
|
Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole
[Russell]
|
14118
|
We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity
[Russell]
|
14116
|
Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and +
[Russell]
|
14117
|
Numbers are properties of classes
[Russell]
|
14119
|
We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other
[Russell]
|
14120
|
Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic
[Russell]
|
14121
|
The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable
[Russell]
|
14122
|
Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth
[Russell]
|
14123
|
Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable
[Russell]
|
10583
|
Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation
[Russell]
|
10582
|
The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity
[Russell]
|
10584
|
A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation
[Russell]
|
14124
|
Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater
[Russell]
|
14125
|
Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction
[Russell]
|
14126
|
Order rests on 'between' and 'separation'
[Russell]
|
14127
|
Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations
[Russell]
|
10585
|
Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality
[Russell]
|
10586
|
'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness
[Russell]
|
14128
|
Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them
[Russell]
|
14129
|
Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one
[Russell]
|
9977
|
Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities
[Russell]
|
14132
|
Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic
[Russell]
|
14133
|
There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal)
[Russell]
|
14134
|
Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole
[Russell]
|
14135
|
Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all)
[Russell]
|
14137
|
'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned
[Russell]
|
14138
|
You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it
[Russell]
|
14140
|
For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals
[Russell]
|
14139
|
Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic
[Russell]
|
14142
|
Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance
[Russell]
|
14141
|
Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction
[Russell]
|
14143
|
ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers
[Russell]
|
14144
|
Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes
[Russell]
|
14145
|
For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers
[Russell]
|
14146
|
We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another
[Russell]
|
14147
|
Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite
[Russell]
|
14149
|
The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes
[Russell]
|
14148
|
Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing
[Russell]
|
14151
|
Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists
[Russell]
|
14152
|
In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses
[Russell]
|
14153
|
In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience
[Russell]
|
14154
|
Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space
[Russell]
|
14155
|
Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective)
[Russell, by PG]
|
14156
|
Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line
[Russell]
|
14158
|
Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order
[Russell]
|
14159
|
In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives
[Russell]
|
14160
|
Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry
[Russell]
|
14161
|
Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence
[Russell]
|
22303
|
It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false
[Russell]
|
14162
|
Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist
[Russell]
|
14163
|
Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points
[Russell]
|
14164
|
The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts
[Russell]
|
14166
|
Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity
[Russell]
|
14165
|
Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum
[Russell]
|
14167
|
The only classes are things, predicates and relations
[Russell]
|
14169
|
The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist
[Russell]
|
14168
|
Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times
[Russell]
|
14170
|
Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences
[Russell]
|
14171
|
Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction
[Russell]
|
14172
|
Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them
[Russell]
|
14173
|
What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them
[Russell]
|
14174
|
The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter
[Russell]
|
14175
|
We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts
[Russell]
|
14176
|
"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died"
[Russell]
|
21555
|
For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x
[Russell]
|
18002
|
As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables
[Russell]
|
18003
|
In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless
[Russell, by Magidor]
|
21341
|
Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential
[Russell, by Heil]
|
18246
|
Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions
[Shapiro on Russell]
|
19157
|
Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible
[Russell, by Davidson]
|
6510
|
Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
6415
|
After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
6514
|
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
7290
|
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa
[Russell, by Thompson]
|
13468
|
Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless
[Russell, by Hart,WD]
|
21724
|
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
5357
|
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge
[Russell]
|
5358
|
'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses
[Russell]
|
5362
|
It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist
[Russell]
|
5363
|
If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions
[Russell]
|
5367
|
Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic
[Russell]
|
5364
|
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves
[Russell]
|
5365
|
Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world
[Russell]
|
5359
|
Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain
[Russell]
|
5366
|
We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection
[Russell]
|
5361
|
Philosophers must get used to absurdities
[Russell]
|
5368
|
Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent
[Russell]
|
5372
|
There is no reason to think that objects have colours
[Russell]
|
5371
|
Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate
[Russell]
|
5370
|
Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them
[Russell]
|
5369
|
It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it
[Russell]
|
5375
|
Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things
[Russell]
|
5376
|
I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted
[Russell]
|
5373
|
'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental
[Russell]
|
5377
|
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements
[Russell]
|
5383
|
Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal
[Russell]
|
5389
|
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience
[Russell]
|
5378
|
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance
[Russell]
|
5382
|
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals
[Russell, by PG]
|
5379
|
If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds
[Russell]
|
5381
|
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person
[Russell]
|
5380
|
In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data
[Russell]
|
5384
|
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'
[Russell]
|
5385
|
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description
[Russell]
|
5386
|
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind
[Russell]
|
5387
|
It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual
[Russell]
|
5393
|
We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws
[Russell]
|
5388
|
Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted
[Russell]
|
5391
|
Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions
[Russell]
|
5390
|
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck
[Russell]
|
5394
|
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question
[Russell]
|
5392
|
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will
[Russell]
|
5397
|
The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience
[Russell]
|
5398
|
Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value
[Russell]
|
5399
|
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it
[Russell]
|
5400
|
In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four
[Russell]
|
5396
|
Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle
[Russell]
|
5401
|
The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction
[Russell]
|
5395
|
Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true
[Russell]
|
5405
|
The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things
[Russell]
|
4427
|
Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth
[Russell]
|
4429
|
If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality
[Russell]
|
4030
|
Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations)
[Russell, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
5409
|
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist'
[Russell]
|
5408
|
If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought
[Russell]
|
4441
|
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal
[Russell]
|
4428
|
Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives)
[Russell]
|
5406
|
Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals
[Russell]
|
4479
|
All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all
[Russell, by Loux]
|
5407
|
That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals
[Russell]
|
5410
|
I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red
[Russell]
|
4430
|
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals
[Russell]
|
5411
|
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given
[Russell]
|
5414
|
Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past
[Russell]
|
5413
|
Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles
[Russell]
|
5412
|
Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident
[Russell]
|
5415
|
As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees
[Russell]
|
5416
|
If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct
[Russell]
|
5426
|
Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself
[Russell]
|
5418
|
In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths
[Russell]
|
5425
|
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two
[Russell]
|
21711
|
Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
5427
|
Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents
[Russell]
|
5420
|
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities
[Russell]
|
5419
|
Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements
[Russell]
|
5417
|
A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible
[Russell]
|
5423
|
If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent
[Russell]
|
5422
|
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible
[Russell]
|
5424
|
Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth
[Russell]
|
7395
|
Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence
[Joslin on Russell]
|
5428
|
Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't
[Russell]
|
5421
|
The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth
[Russell]
|
5430
|
A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning
[Russell]
|
5429
|
True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief
[Russell]
|
5431
|
Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion'
[Russell]
|
5434
|
Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom
[Russell]
|
5432
|
Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole
[Russell]
|
17627
|
It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises
[Russell]
|
17628
|
Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects
[Russell]
|
17629
|
Which premises are ultimate varies with context
[Russell]
|
17630
|
The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion
[Russell]
|
17632
|
Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable
[Russell]
|
17631
|
Induction is inferring premises from consequences
[Russell]
|
17633
|
The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations
[Russell]
|
17638
|
If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone
[Russell]
|
17639
|
Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions
[Russell]
|
17637
|
The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict
[Russell]
|
17640
|
Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results
[Russell]
|
17641
|
Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation
[Russell]
|
23025
|
Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence
[Russell]
|
6483
|
Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain
[Russell, by Robinson,H]
|
8244
|
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science
[Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
|
6459
|
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data
[Russell]
|
6458
|
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to
[Russell]
|
6461
|
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands
[Russell]
|
6460
|
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind
[Russell]
|
6462
|
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics
[Russell]
|
6463
|
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do
[Russell]
|
6464
|
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject
[Russell]
|
6470
|
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes
[Russell]
|
6465
|
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it
[Russell]
|
6466
|
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities
[Russell]
|
6467
|
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once
[Russell]
|
6468
|
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives'
[Russell]
|
6469
|
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them
[Russell]
|
6471
|
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate
[Russell]
|
6473
|
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws
[Russell]
|
6472
|
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid
[Russell]
|
18130
|
Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
21560
|
Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context
[Russell]
|
21561
|
'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless
[Russell]
|
21562
|
There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth
[Russell]
|
22315
|
There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence
[Potter on Russell]
|
23476
|
Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form
[Russell]
|
23477
|
We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are
[Russell]
|
18273
|
Logical truths are known by their extreme generality
[Russell]
|
23457
|
Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules)
[Morris,M on Russell]
|
21556
|
Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility
[Russell, by Lackey]
|
21566
|
'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value
[Russell]
|
21567
|
'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type
[Russell]
|
21568
|
A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments
[Russell]
|
18126
|
A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
18128
|
Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
21718
|
Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets
[Russell, by Linsky,B]
|
10418
|
Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous
[Swoyer on Russell]
|
10047
|
Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms
[Russell, by Musgrave]
|
23478
|
Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed
[Morris,M on Russell]
|
6407
|
The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
11064
|
Classes can be reduced to propositional functions
[Russell, by Hanna]
|
18124
|
Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection
[Russell, by Bostock]
|
13365
|
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox
[Priest,G on Russell]
|
10711
|
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing
[Potter on Russell]
|
9127
|
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property
[Russell, by Sorensen]
|
7531
|
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert
[Russell]
|
21559
|
We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are)
[Russell]
|
21558
|
'Predicative' norms are those which define a class
[Russell]
|
6343
|
For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond
[Horwich on Russell]
|
7534
|
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist
[Russell, by Monk]
|
7545
|
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed
[Russell]
|
7546
|
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation
[Russell]
|
7547
|
Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles
[Russell]
|
7548
|
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions
[Russell]
|
7549
|
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist
[Russell]
|
7550
|
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds
[Russell]
|
7551
|
Matter is a logical construction
[Russell]
|
7552
|
Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space
[Russell]
|
7553
|
Sense-data are purely physical
[Russell]
|
14327
|
Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other
[Russell, by Mumford]
|
16045
|
General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them
[Russell, by Bennett,K]
|
9051
|
Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic
[Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
|
21597
|
Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false
[Russell, by Williamson]
|
9054
|
Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language
[Russell]
|