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Full Idea
When, after hearing the notes of a melody, I perceive the melody, the notes are not presented as still existing.
Gist of Idea
When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing
Source
Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.31)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.31
A Reaction
This is a good example, supporting Meinong's idea that we focus on 'intentional objects', rather than actual objects.
Related Idea
Idea 21537 I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
9825 | A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
8718 | Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
8971 | There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
22320 | An 'object' is just what can be referred to without possible non-existence [Wittgenstein] |
10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |