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Full Idea
If two people can perceive the same object, as the possibility of any common world requires, then the object of an external perception is not in the mind of the percipient.
Gist of Idea
If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind
Source
Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.33)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.33
A Reaction
This is merely an assertion of the realist view, rather than an argument. I take representative realism to tell a perfectly good story that permits two subjective representations of the same object.
| 21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
| 21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
| 21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
| 21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
| 21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
| 21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
| 21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
| 21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
| 21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |