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Single Idea 21545

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.

Gist of Idea

I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting

Source

Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.81

A Reaction

The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?

The 17 ideas with the same theme [status of 'objects' that can't actually exist]:

10945 Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
21531 Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
21545 I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
21547 On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
18777 If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
18948 There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]