more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.
Gist of Idea
I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting
Source
Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.81
A Reaction
The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?
| 21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
| 21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
| 21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |