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Single Idea 21574

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems ]

Full Idea

Hegel's confusion of the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of identity ...is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions.

Gist of Idea

Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors

Source

Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2 n1)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Our Knowledge of the External World' [Routledge 1993], p.48


A Reaction

[He explains the confusion in more detail in the note] Russell cites an English translation, and I am wondering how this occurs in the German. Plato has been accused of similar elementary blunders about properties. Russell treats Berkeley similarly.

Related Ideas

Idea 1103 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]

Idea 3324 Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]


The 21 ideas from 'Our Knowledge of the External World'

Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]
Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]