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Single Idea 21575

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets ]

Full Idea

When a group of objects have the similarity we are inclined to attribute to possession of a common quality, the membership of the group will serve all the purposes of the supposed common quality ...which need not be assumed to exist.

Gist of Idea

When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group

Source

Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Our Knowledge of the External World' [Routledge 1993], p.51


A Reaction

This is the earliest account I have found of properties being treated as sets of objects. It more or less coincides with the invention of set theory. I am reminded of Idea 9208. What is the bazzing property? It's what those three things have in common.

Related Idea

Idea 9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]


The 22 ideas with the same theme [properties are just classes of certain objects]:

When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]