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Single Idea 21575

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets ]

Full Idea

When a group of objects have the similarity we are inclined to attribute to possession of a common quality, the membership of the group will serve all the purposes of the supposed common quality ...which need not be assumed to exist.

Gist of Idea

When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group

Source

Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Our Knowledge of the External World' [Routledge 1993], p.51

A Reaction

This is the earliest account I have found of properties being treated as sets of objects. It more or less coincides with the invention of set theory. I am reminded of Idea 9208. What is the bazzing property? It's what those three things have in common.

Related Idea

Idea 9208 Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]

The 21 ideas from 'Our Knowledge of the External World'

21571 Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
21572 Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
21573 When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
21576 With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
21577 Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
21574 Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
21579 Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
21578 Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
6416 Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
21581 We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]
21580 Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
21582 Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
21583 When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
21584 A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
21585 The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
21586 The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
21588 Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
21587 Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
21684 Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
22316 A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]