more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 21579
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
]
Full Idea
Objects of sense are called 'real' when they have the kind of connection with other objects of sense which experience has led us to regard as normal; when they fail this, they are called 'illusions'.
Gist of Idea
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way
Source
Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 3)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Our Knowledge of the External World' [Routledge 1993], p.93
A Reaction
This rests rather too much on the concept of 'normal', but offers an attractive coherence account of perception. Direct perceptions are often invoked by anti-coherentists, but I think coherence is just as much needed in that realm.
The
21 ideas
from 'Our Knowledge of the External World'
21571
|
Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy
[Russell]
|
21572
|
Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other
[Russell]
|
21573
|
When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all
[Russell]
|
21576
|
With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible
[Russell]
|
21575
|
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group
[Russell]
|
21577
|
Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality
[Russell]
|
21574
|
Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors
[Russell]
|
21579
|
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way
[Russell]
|
21578
|
Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate
[Russell]
|
6416
|
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world
[Russell, by Grayling]
|
21581
|
We never experience times, but only succession of events
[Russell]
|
21580
|
Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them
[Russell]
|
21582
|
Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics
[Russell]
|
21583
|
When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process
[Russell]
|
21584
|
A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom
[Russell]
|
21585
|
The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time
[Russell]
|
21586
|
The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context
[Russell]
|
21588
|
Logic gives the method of research in philosophy
[Russell]
|
21587
|
Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system
[Russell]
|
21684
|
Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts
[Russell]
|
22316
|
A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive
[Russell]
|