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Single Idea 21579

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism ]

Full Idea

Objects of sense are called 'real' when they have the kind of connection with other objects of sense which experience has led us to regard as normal; when they fail this, they are called 'illusions'.

Gist of Idea

Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way

Source

Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 3)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Our Knowledge of the External World' [Routledge 1993], p.93

A Reaction

This rests rather too much on the concept of 'normal', but offers an attractive coherence account of perception. Direct perceptions are often invoked by anti-coherentists, but I think coherence is just as much needed in that realm.

The 21 ideas from 'Our Knowledge of the External World'

21571 Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
21572 Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
21573 When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
21576 With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
21577 Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
21574 Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
21579 Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
21578 Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
6416 Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
21581 We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]
21580 Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
21582 Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
21583 When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
21584 A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
21585 The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
21586 The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
21588 Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
21587 Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
21684 Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
22316 A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]