more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 21591

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance ]

Full Idea

My thesis is that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon. In cases of unclarity, statements remain true or false, but speakers of the language have no way of knowing which. Higher-order vagueness consists in ignorance about ignorance.

Gist of Idea

Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which

Source

Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], Intro)

Book Ref

Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.3


A Reaction

He has plumped for the intuitively least plausible theory. It means that a hair dropping out of someone's head triggers a situation where they are 'bald', but none of us know when that was. And Rembrandt became 'old' in an instant.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [vagueness arising from our imprecise knowledge]:

Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]