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Single Idea 21593
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
]
Full Idea
Unlike Aristotle, Stoics did not reject Bivalence for future contingencies; it is true or false that there will be a sea-fight tomorrow.
Gist of Idea
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence
Source
report of Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE], 19a31) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 1.2
Book Ref
Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.12
A Reaction
I'd never quite registered this simple account of the sea-fight. As Williamson emphasises, one should not lightly reject the principle of bivalence. Has Aristotle entered a slippery slope? Stoics disagreed with Aristotle.
The
19 ideas
from 'On Interpretation'
2337
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For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts
[Aristotle, by Putnam]
|
22272
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Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates'
[Potter on Aristotle]
|
13763
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Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all
[Aristotle]
|
1701
|
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false
[Aristotle]
|
1702
|
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary
[Aristotle]
|
1703
|
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary
[Aristotle]
|
21593
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In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence
[Aristotle, by Williamson]
|
1704
|
Statements are true according to how things actually are
[Aristotle]
|
1705
|
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false
[Aristotle]
|
1706
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Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought
[Aristotle]
|
1707
|
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology
[Aristotle]
|
1708
|
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries?
[Aristotle]
|
9405
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Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values
[Aristotle]
|
9728
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Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
9729
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Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9730
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Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9731
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Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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9732
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Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
9733
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Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
[Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|