more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 21619

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance ]

Full Idea

If, in judging a heap as grains are removed, omniscient speakers all stop at the same point, it must does mark some sort of previously hidden boundary. ...If there is no hidden boundary, then different omniscient speakers would stop at different points.

Gist of Idea

If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is

Source

Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 7.3)

Book Ref

Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.200


A Reaction

A very nice thought experiment, which obviously won't settle anything, but brings out nicely the view the vagueness is a sort of ignorance. God is never vague in the application of terms (though God might withhold the application if there is no boundary).


The 14 ideas with the same theme [vagueness arising from our imprecise knowledge]:

Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]