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Single Idea 21622
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
]
Full Idea
A common complaint against the epistemic view is that to postulate a matter of fact in borderline cases is to suppose, incoherently, that the meanings of our words draw a line where our use of them does not.
Gist of Idea
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use
Source
Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 7.5)
Book Ref
Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.205
A Reaction
This doesn't necessarily seem to require the view that the meaning of words is their usage. Just that if there is one consensus on usage, it seems unlikely that there is a different underlying reality about the true meaning. Externalist meanings?
The
14 ideas
with the same theme
[vagueness arising from our imprecise knowledge]:
12516
|
Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory
[Locke]
|
12517
|
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas
[Locke]
|
23542
|
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause
[Fine,K]
|
9044
|
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9048
|
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics
[Keefe/Smith]
|
9055
|
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary
[Keefe/Smith]
|
6863
|
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge
[Williamson]
|
21591
|
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which
[Williamson]
|
21619
|
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is
[Williamson]
|
21620
|
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance
[Williamson]
|
21622
|
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use
[Williamson]
|
9120
|
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts
[Williamson]
|
16226
|
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons
[Hawley]
|
9116
|
Vague words have hidden boundaries
[Sorensen]
|