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Full Idea
The failure of the KK principle is not news. The standard counterexamples involve knowing subjects who lack the concept of knowledge, or have not reflected on their knowledge, and therefore do not know that they know.
Clarification
The KK principle is knowing that you know
Gist of Idea
Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered
Source
Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 8.2)
Book Ref
Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.225
A Reaction
There is also the timid but knowledgeable pupil, who can't believe they know so much. The simplest case would be if we accept that animals know lots of things, but are largely devoid of any metathinking.
| 6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 8836 | Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet] |
| 8837 | Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet] |
| 12413 | A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
| 4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
| 6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
| 19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |