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Full Idea
To know, believe, hope, or fear that A, one must grasp the thought that A. In contrast, to fail to know, believe, hope or fear that A, one need not grasp the thought that A.
Gist of Idea
To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them
Source
Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 9.3 c)
Book Ref
Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.261
A Reaction
A simple point, which at least shows that propositional attitudes are a two-stage operation.
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
| 2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |