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Single Idea 21653

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

A more radical alternative which takes names not to be referring even in the broader sense, but only takes speakers to refer with uses of names.

Gist of Idea

Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 08.1)

Book Ref

Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.205


A Reaction

Given that you can make up nicknames and silly nonce names for people, this seems plausible. I may say a name in a crowded room and three people look up.

Related Idea

Idea 21650 No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber]


The 22 ideas with the same theme [names do no more than pick out an object]:

Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]