more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 21663

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals ]

Full Idea

Counterfactuals are important for reasoning about the past and to plan for the future. If we want to learn from our mistakes, it is important to think about what would have happened if I had done things differently.

Gist of Idea

Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.1)

Book Ref

Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.326


A Reaction

A thought also found in Tim Williamson, but not the sort of thing you hear from Lewis or Stalnaker. It is a nice example of how highly abstract and theoretical problems need to be slotted into human psychology.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [facts in worlds different from the actual world]:

It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]