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Single Idea 21666

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics ]

Full Idea

The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics.

Gist of Idea

'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure

Source

Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2)

Book Ref

Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.330

A Reaction

Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort).

The 30 ideas from 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics'

21634 Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber]
21635 Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber]
21636 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber]
21637 If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber]
21638 Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber]
21639 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber]
21640 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber]
21641 Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber]
21643 The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber]
21644 Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber]
21645 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber]
21646 The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber]
21647 Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber]
21648 Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber]
21649 How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber]
21652 Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber]
21653 Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
21654 The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
21655 Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber]
21656 Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber]
21657 Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber]
21658 Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber]
21659 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber]
21660 Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber]
21661 There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
21662 Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
21663 Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
21664 Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber]
21666 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber]
21665 The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber]