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Single Idea 21666
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
]
Full Idea
The dilemma of neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is that on an ordinary reading of prioriy, 'fundamentality' won't give the intended results, and on a metaphysical reading it turns into esoteric metaphysics.
Gist of Idea
'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure
Source
Thomas Hofweber (Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics [2016], 13.4.2)
Book Ref
Hofweber,Thomas: 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' [OUP 2018], p.330
A Reaction
Hofweber is hostile to 'esoteric' metaphysics, but sympathetic to 'egalitarian' metaphysics, which anyone can understand (with a bit of effort).
The
30 ideas
from 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics'
21634
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Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like
[Hofweber]
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21635
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Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires
[Hofweber]
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21636
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'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases
[Hofweber]
|
21637
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If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities
[Hofweber]
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21638
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Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions
[Hofweber]
|
21639
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'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer
[Hofweber]
|
21640
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'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely'
[Hofweber]
|
21641
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Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world
[Hofweber]
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21643
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The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality
[Hofweber]
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21644
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Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols
[Hofweber]
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21645
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'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense
[Hofweber]
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21646
|
The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words
[Hofweber]
|
21647
|
Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought
[Hofweber]
|
21648
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Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities
[Hofweber]
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21649
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How can words be used for counting if they are objects?
[Hofweber]
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21652
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Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise
[Hofweber]
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21653
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Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
[Hofweber]
|
21654
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The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent
[Hofweber]
|
21655
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Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence
[Hofweber]
|
21656
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Proposition have no content, because they are content
[Hofweber]
|
21657
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Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types'
[Hofweber]
|
21658
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Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them
[Hofweber]
|
21659
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'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties
[Hofweber]
|
21660
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Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things
[Hofweber]
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21661
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There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us
[Hofweber]
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21662
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Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking?
[Hofweber]
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21663
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Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes
[Hofweber]
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21664
|
Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together
[Hofweber]
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21666
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'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure
[Hofweber]
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21665
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The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes
[Hofweber]
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