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Single Idea 21677

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence ]

Full Idea

How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true?

Gist of Idea

How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true?

Source

M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38)

Book Ref

Cicero: 'On Fate, Stoic Paradoxes, Oratory', ed/tr. Rackham,H. [Harvard Loeb 1942], p.235


A Reaction

We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'.

Related Idea

Idea 21676 Epicureans say disjunctions can be true whiile the disjuncts are not true [Epicurus, by Cicero]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [propositions can only be true or false]:

In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter]
How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner]
'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson]
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]