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Single Idea 21702

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

In 1918 Russell insists that the world does contain nonlinguistic things that are akin to sentences and are asserted by them; he merely does not call them propositions. He calls them facts.

Gist of Idea

In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts'

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.81

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.81

A Reaction

Clarification! I have always been bewildered by the early Russell view of propositions as actual ingredients of the world. If we say that sentences assert facts, that makes more sense. Russell never believed in the mental entities I call 'propositions'.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [propositions as made of real objects]:

21726 In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
21702 In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
23453 Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
19164 If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
9085 If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
19216 Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
21662 Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
16380 Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]