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Single Idea 21712

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique ]

Full Idea

Time was when I thought there were propositions, but it does not seem to me very plausible to say that in addition to facts there are also these curious shadowy things going about such 'That today is Wednesday' when it is in fact Tuesday.

Gist of Idea

I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], p.197), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 3.1

Book Ref

Linsky,Bernard: 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' [CSLI 1999], p.46


A Reaction

[Ref to Papers v8] I take Russell to have abandoned his propositions because his conception of them was mistaken. Presumably my thinking 'Today is Wednesay' conjures up a false proposition, which had not previously existed.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [rejection of the existence of propositions]:

An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]