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Full Idea
A defence of the ramified theory of types comes in seeing it as a system of intensional logic which includes the 'no class' account of sets, and indeed the whole development of mathematics, as just a part.
Gist of Idea
Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (Mathematical logic and theory of types [1908]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1
Book Ref
Linsky,Bernard: 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' [CSLI 1999], p.93
A Reaction
So Linsky's basic project is to save logicism, by resting on intensional logic (rather than extensional logic and set theory). I'm not aware that Linsky has acquired followers for this. Maybe Crispin Wright has commented?
Related Idea
Idea 15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
| 21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
| 18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| 10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
| 9224 | Proceduralism offers a version of logicism with no axioms, or objects, or ontological commitment [Fine,K] |
| 13664 | Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro] |
| 18167 | We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy] |
| 19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
| 21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |