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Full Idea
While the multiple relation theory (of belief, or of judgement) is nominally an account of belief and judgement, the emphasis in the account is on eliminating the need for propositions as objects of rational belief or judgement.
Gist of Idea
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2
Book Ref
Linsky,Bernard: 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' [CSLI 1999], p.123
A Reaction
The idea is that the mind relates directly with the ingredients of the proposition, and with the universals (such as relations) which connect them. He cuts out the middle man, just as he cut out sense-data, for similar reasons of economy.
Related Idea
Idea 21725 The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
| 6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
| 6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
| 21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |