more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 21726

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

In every proposition that we can apprehend, ...all the constituents are real entities with which we have immediate acquaintance.

Gist of Idea

In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance

Source

Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.56), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2

Book Ref

Linsky,Bernard: 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' [CSLI 1999], p.128


A Reaction

This is the clearest statement of the 'Russellian' concept of a proposition. It strikes me as entirely wrong. The examples are always nice concrete objects like Mont Blanc, but as an account of sophisticated general propositions it seem hopeless.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [propositions as made of real objects]:

In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]