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Single Idea 21750

[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth ]

Full Idea

Science, thanks to its links with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth.

Gist of Idea

Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation

Source

Willard Quine (On the Nature of Moral Values [1978], p.63)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.63

A Reaction

I would describe what he is affirming as a 'robust' theory of truth. An interesting aside, given his usual allegiance to disquotational, and even redundancy, accounts of truth. You can hardly rely on observations if you think they contain no truth.

The 35 ideas with the same theme [truth is a successful match between mental states and reality]:

13776 Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
35 A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
1704 Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
586 Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
19165 Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
22104 Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas]
9107 A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
4816 A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza]
13000 Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz]
5539 We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant]
19071 The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel]
5783 Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
7395 Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell]
5428 Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell]
6343 For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
18707 All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
10967 Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
7087 Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
4702 The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
7056 Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
21750 Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine]
10835 True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL]
6266 We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
7617 Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam]
4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong]
3742 Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
18702 Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
23292 Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3508 Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
6342 Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
18364 Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
10354 Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch]
22324 It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter]
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]