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Single Idea 2179

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty ]

Full Idea

The conception of the moral self as characterless leaves only a limited positive role to other people in one's moral life.

Gist of Idea

If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives

Source

Bernard Williams (Shame and Necessity [1993], IV - p.95)

Book Ref

Williams,Bernard: 'Shame and Necessity' [California 1994], p.95

The 65 ideas from Bernard Williams

22454 We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
22407 Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
22410 Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22408 Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
22411 For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
22409 We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
4110 Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
4113 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
4112 A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
4114 Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
4116 A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
4120 It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
4121 Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
4122 If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
4124 Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
4131 Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B]
4133 Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B]
4132 The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
4128 Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
4134 The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
4135 Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
4244 It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B]
4243 Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B]
4245 Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
4246 Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
4247 It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B]
4252 Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
4250 The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
4249 "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
4248 Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
22355 In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
22453 Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
22455 Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
20168 Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
20167 Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
3234 Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
3233 Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
3235 It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
3236 Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
9284 Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
23282 If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
24008 Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
24009 Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
24010 An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
24012 Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
23278 For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
23279 It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
23280 Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
7946 The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
3238 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
3239 You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
23283 Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
2169 Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
2172 The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
2174 Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
2176 There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
2175 There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]
2180 If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
2178 In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
2179 If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
2181 It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
22450 If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
4366 We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]