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Single Idea 21834

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind ]

Full Idea

There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism.

Gist of Idea

Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be

Source

Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology')

Book Ref

Flanagan,Owen: 'The Really Hard Problem' [MIT 2007], p.94

A Reaction

It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [all mental events can be explained physically]:

5713 You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
7550 We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
9317 Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
3474 If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
3500 Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
6986 Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
3433 The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
7879 Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
20971 Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
21834 Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
10826 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
6530 We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
6536 Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
7704 Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
4903 Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
4920 Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
4688 We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
8685 Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend]