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Single Idea 2187
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
]
Full Idea
When we entertain any suspicion that a philosophical term is without any meaning or idea, we need but enquire "from what impression is that supposed idea derived?"
Gist of Idea
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from
Source
David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], II.17)
Book Ref
Hume,David: 'Enquiries Conc. Human Understanding, Morals', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1975], p.22
The
28 ideas
with the same theme
[analysis concentrating on contents and source of concepts]:
23682
|
It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things
[Plato]
|
2187
|
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from
[Hume]
|
9350
|
Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects
[Kant]
|
18259
|
Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts
[Kant]
|
5530
|
Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics
[Kant]
|
23188
|
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts
[Nietzsche]
|
8415
|
Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object
[Frege]
|
7132
|
Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them
[Nietzsche]
|
10838
|
To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage
[Dummett]
|
8559
|
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction
[Shoemaker]
|
17034
|
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail
[Kripke]
|
6980
|
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
[Jackson]
|
6983
|
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
[Jackson]
|
14707
|
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings
[Jackson, by Schroeter]
|
15212
|
Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know
[Harré/Madden]
|
2946
|
You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis
[Lehrer]
|
11832
|
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
[Wiggins]
|
8605
|
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive
[Lewis]
|
2474
|
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
|
13395
|
If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
[Jubien]
|
23728
|
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept
[Smith,M]
|
11159
|
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis
[Fine,K]
|
9184
|
We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed
[Williamson]
|
14986
|
Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones
[Sider]
|
14899
|
Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think?
[Ladyman/Ross]
|
17729
|
Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses
[Jenkins]
|
23770
|
Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set
[Williams,NE]
|
19259
|
If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis
[Vaidya]
|