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Single Idea 2193
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
]
Full Idea
Without exception, knowledge of cause and effect is not attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.
Gist of Idea
No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions
Source
David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.23)
Book Ref
Hume,David: 'Enquiries Conc. Human Understanding, Morals', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1975], p.27
The
85 ideas
from 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding'
3661
|
'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements
[Hume, by Strawson,G]
|
3902
|
Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions'
[Scruton on Hume]
|
6350
|
Premises can support an argument without entailing it
[Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
|
8344
|
At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events
[Hume, by Davidson]
|
15249
|
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity
[Harré/Madden on Hume]
|
8339
|
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity
[Hume, by Strawson,G]
|
4636
|
All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes)
[Hume]
|
13602
|
We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning
[Hume]
|
8422
|
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed
[Hume]
|
17712
|
General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular
[Hume]
|
2182
|
Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones
[Hume]
|
23631
|
Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species
[Reid on Hume]
|
2184
|
All ideas are copies of impressions
[Hume]
|
2183
|
We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences
[Hume]
|
2185
|
The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds
[Hume]
|
2186
|
We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced
[Hume]
|
23421
|
If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in
[Hume]
|
2187
|
If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from
[Hume]
|
2189
|
All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect
[Hume]
|
3662
|
Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS
[Hume, by Strawson,G]
|
2191
|
Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world
[Hume]
|
2190
|
All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact
[Hume]
|
2192
|
All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses
[Hume]
|
2194
|
How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire?
[Hume]
|
2193
|
No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions
[Hume]
|
2196
|
The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy
[Hume]
|
2195
|
We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes
[Hume]
|
2197
|
Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application
[Hume]
|
2198
|
We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread
[Hume]
|
3598
|
Hume just shows induction isn't deduction
[Williams,M on Hume]
|
2199
|
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places
[Hume]
|
2200
|
All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past
[Hume]
|
2702
|
Only madmen dispute the authority of experience
[Hume]
|
2201
|
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this
[Hume]
|
2202
|
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience
[Hume]
|
2204
|
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning
[Hume]
|
2203
|
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one
[Hume]
|
2205
|
You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience
[Hume]
|
2206
|
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation
[Hume]
|
2207
|
Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions
[Hume]
|
2208
|
Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects
[Hume]
|
2209
|
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination
[Hume]
|
2210
|
A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance
[Hume]
|
8544
|
Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance
[Shoemaker on Hume]
|
2211
|
When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly
[Hume]
|
2212
|
An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him
[Hume]
|
2213
|
Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation
[Hume]
|
2214
|
Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning
[Hume]
|
2215
|
There is no such thing as chance
[Hume]
|
2216
|
We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions
[Hume]
|
8341
|
Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation
[Hume, by Strawson,G]
|
2217
|
When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise
[Hume]
|
2218
|
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities
[Hume]
|
2220
|
Only experience teaches us about our wills
[Hume]
|
4771
|
In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events
[Psillos on Hume]
|
5194
|
Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws
[Ayer on Hume]
|
2221
|
A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience
[Hume]
|
2222
|
The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions
[Hume]
|
2223
|
Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains
[Hume]
|
2224
|
Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition
[Hume]
|
2225
|
If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime
[Hume]
|
2226
|
Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind
[Hume]
|
3655
|
Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation
[Trusted on Hume]
|
10328
|
We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection
[Hume]
|
2227
|
A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored
[Hume]
|
2228
|
All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle'
[Hume]
|
2229
|
To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event
[Hume]
|
2230
|
Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement
[Hume, by PG]
|
2232
|
You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect
[Hume]
|
2233
|
No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy
[Hume]
|
4772
|
If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved
[Hume]
|
2234
|
It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other
[Hume]
|
2235
|
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference
[Hume]
|
2237
|
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects
[Hume]
|
2236
|
Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason
[Hume]
|
2238
|
Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects
[Hume]
|
2239
|
If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension
[Hume]
|
7700
|
We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles
[Hume]
|
2240
|
It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument
[Hume]
|
2241
|
The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it
[Hume]
|
2242
|
Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty
[Hume]
|
2243
|
Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding
[Hume]
|
2246
|
If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames
[Hume]
|
2245
|
A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect
[Hume]
|
2244
|
It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist
[Hume]
|