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Single Idea 21930

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning ]

Full Idea

A noun [for Aristotle] is proper when it has but a single sense. Better, it is only in this case that it is properly a noun. Univocity is the essence, or better, the telos of language.

Clarification

'Univocity' is having only a single meaning

Gist of Idea

For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language

Source

Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5

Book Ref

Glendinning,Simon: 'Derrida: a Very Short Intro' [OUP 2011], p.55


A Reaction

[no ref given] His target seem to be Aristotelian definition, and also formal logic, which usually needs unambiguous meanings. {I'm puzzled that he thinks 'telos' is simply better than 'essence', since it is quite different].


The 30 ideas with the same theme [how one thing can represent another thing]:

The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]