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Single Idea 21963

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism ]

Full Idea

Since every basic truth depends on God's omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make it....that one and two should not be three.

Gist of Idea

It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three

Source

René Descartes (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1645]), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 01.3

Book Ref

Moore,A.W.: 'The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics' [CUP 2013], p.33


A Reaction

An unusual view. Most people would say that if Descartes can doubt something that simple, he should also doubt his reasons for believing in God's existence.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [denials that mathematics is rooted in experience]:

The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes]
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege]
The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert]
Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell]
It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry]
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C]
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
There is an infinity of mathematical objects, so they can't be physical [Brown,JR]
Numbers are not abstracted from particulars, because each number is a particular [Brown,JR]
If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]