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Single Idea 22023

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value ]

Full Idea

Fichte placed emphasis on human spontaneity, on nothing 'counting' for us unless we somehow bestowed some kind of status on it.

Gist of Idea

Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status

Source

report of Johann Fichte (The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed] [1794]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06

Book Ref

Pinkard,Terry: 'German Philosophy 1760-1860' [CUP 2002], p.134


A Reaction

This idea evidentally arises from Kant's account of thought. Pinkard says this idea inspired the early Romantics. I would have thought the drive to exist (Spinoza's conatus) would make things count whether we liked it or not.


The 13 ideas from 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]'

Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]