more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 22060
[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
]
Full Idea
According to Fichte, spontaneity, self-relatedness, and unity are the basic traits of knowledge (which includes conscience). ...This principle of all knowledge is what he calls the 'I' or the Self.
Gist of Idea
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge
Source
report of Johann Fichte (The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed] [1794]) by Ludwig Siep - Fichte p.58
Book Ref
'A Companion to Continental Philosophy', ed/tr. Critchley,S/Schroeder,W [Blackwell 1999], p.58
A Reaction
This is the idealist view. He gets 'spontaneity' from Kant, which is the mind's contribution to experience. Self-relatedness is the distinctive Fichte idea. Unity presumably means total coherence, which is typical of idealists.
Related Idea
Idea 22066
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[Self can be inferred to exist, rather than experienced]:
|
22528
|
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it
[Aristotle]
|
|
21317
|
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person
[Butler]
|
|
9751
|
To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena
[Kant, by Korsgaard]
|
|
21450
|
Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it
[Kant]
|
|
22060
|
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge
[Fichte, by Siep]
|
|
22066
|
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal
[Novalis on Fichte]
|
|
22016
|
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity
[Fichte, by Pinkard]
|
|
23243
|
Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self
[Fichte]
|
|
22073
|
The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom
[Schelling]
|
|
21225
|
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
|
22323
|
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
|
2940
|
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
|
7109
|
If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally
[Sartre]
|
|
3827
|
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
|
|
3285
|
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it
[Nagel]
|
|
3293
|
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me
[Nagel]
|
|
3244
|
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori
[Nagel]
|
|
3245
|
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity
[Nagel]
|
|
7385
|
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
[Dennett]
|
|
19650
|
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible
[Meillassoux]
|