more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 22126

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

Duns Scotus endorsed Avicenna's theory of the common nature, according to which the essences have an independence and priority to their existence as either universal in the mind or singular outside it.

Gist of Idea

Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence

Source

report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206

Book Ref

'Shorter Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Craig,Edward [Routledge 2005], p.206


A Reaction

I occasionally meet this weird idea in modern discussions of essence (in Lowe?), and now see its origin. It makes little sense without a divine mind to support the independent essences. Scotus had to add a principle of individuation for essences.

Related Idea

Idea 22127 Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [distinctions about how essence should be understood]:

Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]