more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 22145
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
]
Full Idea
The Major Real distinction is if A can exist in the real order without B, and B can exist in the real order without A.
Gist of Idea
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences
Source
report of Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], Bk VII) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 4
Book Ref
Boulter,Stephen: 'Why Medieval Philosophy Matters' [Bloomsbury 2019], p.97
A Reaction
Boulter's example is the distinction between Peter and Paul, where their identity of kind is irrelevant. This is two-way independence.
The
33 ideas
with the same theme
[how we should understand the idea of identity]:
11380
|
Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing
[Aristotle]
|
22143
|
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22146
|
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22145
|
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22144
|
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22147
|
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
22148
|
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B
[Suárez, by Boulter]
|
19394
|
Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality
[Leibniz]
|
1207
|
Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity
[Hume]
|
21290
|
Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different
[Hume]
|
11874
|
Real identity admits of no degrees
[Reid]
|
21320
|
Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define
[Reid]
|
1367
|
Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
[Reid]
|
16022
|
The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege
[Frege, by Noonan]
|
11100
|
Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals
[Frege, by Quine]
|
4893
|
Frege was asking how identities could be informative
[Frege, by Perry]
|
6056
|
Identity is not a relation between objects
[Wittgenstein]
|
17595
|
To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed
[Quine]
|
18965
|
We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology
[Quine]
|
15475
|
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts
[Martin,CB]
|
15486
|
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications
[Martin,CB]
|
18389
|
When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
[Armstrong]
|
16981
|
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation
[Kripke]
|
17509
|
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
[Ayers]
|
4885
|
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
[Perry]
|
11843
|
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
[Wiggins]
|
11864
|
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
[Wiggins]
|
17588
|
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
[Inwagen]
|
6058
|
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
|
11888
|
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic
[Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
|
15603
|
I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
[Fine,K]
|
10522
|
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations
[Hale]
|
8970
|
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity
[Hawthorne]
|