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Single Idea 22154

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence ]

Full Idea

For Aristotle the principle of bivalence is primarily a principle of metaphysics, not logic. It applies to entities in the real order first, and to propositions in the rational order second.

Gist of Idea

For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 5

Book Ref

Boulter,Stephen: 'Why Medieval Philosophy Matters' [Bloomsbury 2019], p.128

A Reaction

This is because nothing is vague. Boulter says this is also the case with non-contradiction. I like this idea very much. I reject the Fregean picture of the autonomy of the rational order. Logic is powerful because it reflects reality.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [propositions can only be true or false]:

21593 In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
22154 For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter]
21677 How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
19043 Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
8173 Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
8195 Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
6889 Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner]
21606 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson]
18780 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
18786 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
4700 A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
4752 Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
9119 No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
6163 If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
4638 The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
23484 Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
18840 When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]