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Single Idea 22178
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
]
Full Idea
If the only objective constraints concern how we should change our credences, but what our initial credences should be is entirely subjective, then individuals with very bizarre opinions about the world will count as perfectly rational.
Gist of Idea
If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional
Source
Samir Okasha (Philosophy of Science: Very Short Intro (2nd ed) [2016], 2)
Book Ref
Okasha,Samir: 'Philosophy of Science: very short intro (2nd ed)' [OUP 2016], p.35
A Reaction
The important rationality has to be the assessement of a diverse batch of evidence, for which there can never be any rules or mathematics.
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[equation showing probability of an inductive truth]:
14280
|
The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first
[Bayes]
|
22656
|
Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible
[James]
|
19143
|
Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences
[Ramsey, by Davidson]
|
19155
|
Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions
[Jeffrey, by Davidson]
|
2751
|
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence
[Dancy,J]
|
2798
|
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
[Horwich]
|
2799
|
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
[Horwich]
|
16802
|
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one
[Lipton]
|
16803
|
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it
[Lipton]
|
16801
|
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true
[Lipton]
|
16837
|
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising'
[Lipton]
|
16839
|
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem
[Lipton]
|
6372
|
Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
17600
|
Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations
[Thagard]
|
14990
|
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre
[Sider]
|
6798
|
Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works
[Bird]
|
22178
|
If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional
[Okasha]
|
17943
|
Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies
[Colyvan]
|
22365
|
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities
[Reiss/Sprenger]
|