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Full Idea
Popper's theory implies that more informative theories seem to be less probable.
Gist of Idea
If a theory is more informative it is less probable
Source
Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 3)
Book Ref
Gorham,Geoffrey: 'Philosophy of Science' [One World 2009], p.75
A Reaction
[On p.75 Gorham replies to this objection] The point is that to be more testable they must be more detailed. He's not wrong. Theories are meant to be general, so they sweep up the details. But they need precise generalities and specifics.
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |