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Full Idea
The strangeness of interpreting theories as mere tools for organising present experience is brought out clearly in sciences like cosmology and paleontology, which largely concern events in the remote past or future.
Gist of Idea
Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future
Source
Geoffrey Gorham (Philosophy of Science [2009], 4)
Book Ref
Gorham,Geoffrey: 'Philosophy of Science' [One World 2009], p.103
A Reaction
Not conclusive. An anti-realist has to interpret those sciences in terms of the current observations that are available.
| 22189 | Why abandon a theory if you don't have a better one? [Gorham] |
| 22190 | If a theory is more informative it is less probable [Gorham] |
| 22196 | For most scientists their concepts are not just useful, but are meant to be true and accurate [Gorham] |
| 22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
| 22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
| 22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
| 22197 | Theories aren't just for organising present experience if they concern the past or future [Gorham] |
| 22193 | Consilience makes the component sciences more likely [Gorham] |
| 22198 | Aristotelian physics has circular celestial motion and linear earthly motion [Gorham] |