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Single Idea 22220
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
]
Full Idea
In Husserl's phenomenology, the intentional object of a memory is the object of a past experience, which is intuitively given to me in the present, not, however, as being present but as being past.
Gist of Idea
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past
Source
report of Edmund Husserl (Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology [1913]) by Rudolf Bernet - Husserl p.203
Book Ref
'A Companion to Continental Philosophy', ed/tr. Critchley,S/Schroeder,W [Blackwell 1999], p.203
A Reaction
I certainly don't have to assess my mental events, and judge which are past, which are now, and which are future imaginings. I suppose Fodor would say they are memories because we find them in the memory-box. How else could it work?
The
44 ideas
from Edmund Husserl
21226
|
Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
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21225
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The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
21228
|
Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy.
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
21224
|
Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
21222
|
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
21223
|
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
19263
|
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones
[Husserl, by Vaidya]
|
22220
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The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past
[Husserl, by Bernet]
|
22216
|
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects
[Husserl, by Bernet]
|
22217
|
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience
[Husserl, by Bernet]
|
22218
|
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences
[Husserl, by Bernet]
|
22219
|
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects
[Husserl, by Bernet]
|
22221
|
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible
[Husserl, by Bernet]
|
22201
|
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful
[Husserl]
|
22202
|
The World is all experiencable objects
[Husserl]
|
21218
|
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos
[Husserl]
|
22203
|
Only facts follow from facts
[Husserl]
|
21221
|
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation
[Husserl]
|
22204
|
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given
[Husserl]
|
22205
|
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory
[Husserl]
|
22206
|
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism
[Husserl]
|
22207
|
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain
[Husserl]
|
22208
|
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence
[Husserl]
|
22210
|
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own
[Husserl]
|
22209
|
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being
[Husserl]
|
22211
|
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge
[Husserl]
|
21220
|
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing
[Husserl]
|
22212
|
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being
[Husserl]
|
22213
|
Absolute reality is an absurdity
[Husserl]
|
22214
|
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience
[Husserl]
|
22215
|
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences
[Husserl]
|
21217
|
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions
[Husserl]
|
15570
|
Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc.
[Husserl, by Polt]
|
7614
|
Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs
[Husserl, by Putnam]
|
6893
|
Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes
[Husserl, by Mautner]
|
21216
|
Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
17444
|
Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence
[Husserl, by Heck]
|
21214
|
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin
[Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
|
9819
|
Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts
[Dummett on Husserl]
|
9851
|
Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them
[Dummett on Husserl]
|
9837
|
0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively
[Husserl, by Dummett]
|
9575
|
Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences
[Husserl, by Frege]
|
9576
|
Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc.
[Husserl]
|
3348
|
If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature
[Benardete,JA on Husserl]
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