more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 22272

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic ]

Full Idea

When Aristotle moved from basic name+verb (in 'De Interpretatione') to noun+noun logic...names had to be treated as special cases, so that 'Socrates' is treated as short for 'everything that is Socrates'.

Gist of Idea

Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates'

Source

comment on Aristotle (On Interpretation [c.330 BCE]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Supp'

Book Ref

Potter,Michael: 'The Rise of Anaytic Philosophy 1879-1930' [Routledge 2020], p.12


A Reaction

Just the sort of rewriting that Russell introduced for definite descriptions. 'Twas ever the logicians' fate to shoehorn ordinary speech into awkward containers.


The 19 ideas from 'On Interpretation'

Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]