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Full Idea
Moore avoided the problematic correspondence between propositions and reality by identifying the former with the latter; the world consists of true propositions, and there is no difference between a true proposition and the fact that makes it true.
Gist of Idea
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts
Source
report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 28 'Refut'
Book Ref
Potter,Michael: 'The Rise of Anaytic Philosophy 1879-1930' [Routledge 2020], p.183
A Reaction
This is "the most platonic system of modern times", he wrote (letter 14.8.1898). He then added platonist ethics. This is a pernicious and absurd doctrine. The obvious problem is that false propositions can be indistinguishable, but differ in ontology.
Related Ideas
Idea 22301 The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
Idea 22306 To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
| 23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
| 22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
| 9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
| 19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
| 19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
| 21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |