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Single Idea 22302

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

Moore avoided the problematic correspondence between propositions and reality by identifying the former with the latter; the world consists of true propositions, and there is no difference between a true proposition and the fact that makes it true.

Gist of Idea

Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts

Source

report of G.E. Moore (The Nature of Judgement [1899]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 28 'Refut'

Book Ref

Potter,Michael: 'The Rise of Anaytic Philosophy 1879-1930' [Routledge 2020], p.183

A Reaction

This is "the most platonic system of modern times", he wrote (letter 14.8.1898). He then added platonist ethics. This is a pernicious and absurd doctrine. The obvious problem is that false propositions can be indistinguishable, but differ in ontology.

Related Ideas

Idea 22301 The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]

Idea 22306 To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]

The 23 ideas from G.E. Moore

21342 A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
17992 The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
7527 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
6405 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
7526 Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
6349 I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
20147 Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
6672 Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]