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Single Idea 22303

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals ]

Full Idea

There seems to be no true proposition of which it makes sense to say that it might have been false. One might as well say that redness might have been a taste and not a colour.

Gist of Idea

It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], §430), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 29 'Analy'

Book Ref

Potter,Michael: 'The Rise of Anaytic Philosophy 1879-1930' [Routledge 2020], p.190

A Reaction

Few thinkers agree with this rejection of counterfactuals. It seems to rely on Moore's idea that true propositions are facts. It also sounds deterministic. Does 'he is standing' mean he couldn't have been sitting (at t)?

The 23 ideas with the same theme [facts in worlds different from the actual world]:

22303 It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
12191 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
3406 Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
15260 Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
8431 Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
6882 Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
6886 Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
6885 Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
6884 Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
6883 Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
14624 Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
16249 A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
14417 Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
21663 Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
19503 An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
14379 Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]