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Single Idea 22318
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
]
Full Idea
Frege's account suffered from a lack of precision about when two sets of truth-conditions should count as equivalent. (Wittgenstein aimed to rectify this defect).
Gist of Idea
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 50 Intro
Book Ref
Potter,Michael: 'The Rise of Anaytic Philosophy 1879-1930' [Routledge 2020], p.335
The
33 ideas
with the same theme
[meaning is the situation making a sentence true]:
22318
|
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent
[Frege, by Potter]
|
4980
|
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false
[Frege]
|
7307
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A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true
[Frege, by Miller,A]
|
18725
|
A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it
[Wittgenstein]
|
8172
|
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true
[Wittgenstein]
|
22430
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If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth
[Quine]
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6281
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Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation
[Putnam]
|
6278
|
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning
[Putnam]
|
19055
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Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence
[Dummett]
|
19056
|
If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions
[Dummett]
|
8168
|
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning
[Dummett]
|
4041
|
Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain
[Davidson]
|
6391
|
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible
[Davidson]
|
15160
|
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead
[Davidson, by Soames]
|
14612
|
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic
[Davidson, by Smart]
|
19152
|
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
[Davidson]
|
19163
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You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
[Davidson]
|
23289
|
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding
[Davidson]
|
18418
|
A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent
[Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
|
2451
|
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
[Fodor]
|
3006
|
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth
[Fodor]
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15152
|
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts
[Soames]
|
15153
|
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings
[Soames]
|
6338
|
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning
[Horwich]
|
7768
|
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation
[Lycan]
|
18992
|
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them
[Yablo]
|
4605
|
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
[Heil]
|
19203
|
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context
[Merricks]
|
18697
|
A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true
[Button]
|
14000
|
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions
[Markosian]
|
19074
|
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)?
[Young,JO]
|
19082
|
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification
[Young,JO]
|
18817
|
We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions
[Rumfitt]
|