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Full Idea
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body, or the human soul of wh9ch psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world.
Gist of Idea
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 1916. 2 Sep), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 58 Intro
Book Ref
Potter,Michael: 'The Rise of Anaytic Philosophy 1879-1930' [Routledge 2020], p.379
A Reaction
This is to treat the self as a phenomenon of thought, rather than of a human being. So if a machine could think, would it hence necessarily have a metaphysical self?
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |